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# SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONCEPTS IN THE WILD

VITALY SHMATIKOV



#### Some 2024 News

## National Public Data breach: What you need to know

In early 2024, National Public Data, an online background check and fraud prevention service, experienced a significant data breach. This breach allegedly exposed up to 2.9 billion records with highly sensitive personal data of up to 170M people in the US, UK, and Canada (Bloomberg Law).

#### China Hack Enabled Vast Spying on U.S. Officials, Likely Ensnaring Thousands of Contacts

Hackers scooped up call logs, unencrypted texts and some audio, piercing America's communications infrastructure

Full compromise of nine major telecom providers: complete metadata for all calls, complete data DoJ wiretapping operations

2.9 billion records with highly sensitive information on 170M people in the US, UK, and Canada leaked from a data broker that performed background checks (filed for bankruptcy in October)

# AT&T says hackers stole records of nearly all cellular customers' calls and texts

https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/national-public-data-breach-what-you-need-to-know-843686f7-06e2-4e91-8a3f-ae30b7213535 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/t-says-hackers-stole-records-nearly-cell-customers-calls-texts-rcna161507 https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-hack-enabled-vast-spying-on-u-s-officials-likely-ensnaring-thousands-of-contacts-1340ba4a

#### Major Data Breaches

Government +	Agency	٠	Year +		Records -	Organization type	Method +	Sources
Shanghai, China	Shanghai Nationa Police Database		2022	1, in ac na m cr	00,000,000, uding name, Iress, birthplace, onal ID number, pile number, all ne/case details	government	unsecured database	[73][74]
India	Indian Council of Medical Research		2023	8' in ID na ni	,000,000+, uding Aadhaar , passport details, nes, phone nbers, addresses	government	hacked by pwn0001	[15]
Unknown	Unknown		2020	20	,000,000	personal and demographic data about residents and their properties of US	Poor security	[57]
?	Unknown agency (believed to be tied to United States Censu Bureau)		2020	20	,000,000	financial	accidentally published	[142]
United States	National Archives Records Administration (U. military veterans records)	nd	2009	76	000,000	military	lost / stolen media	[134]
United States	United States Pos Service	d	2018	6(	000,000	government	poor security	[124]
Philippines	Commission on Elections		2016	5	000,000	government	hacked	
Bangladesh	Office of the Regis General, Birth & D Registration	rar ath	2023	5(	000,000+	government	data leak due to security vulnerabilities	[20]

#### List of data breaches involving companies [edit]

Entity	+ Year +	Records -	Organization type	Method +	Sources +
Yahoo	2013	,000,000,000	web	hacked	[642][643]
National Public Data	2024	,900,000,000+ claimed), including ames, email ddresses, phone umbers, Social ecurity numbers, and hailing addresses	data broker	hacked	[473]
Verifications.io (total leaks)	2019	,000,000,000	online marketing	poor security	[622]
First American Corporation	2019	85,000,000	financial	poor security	[345]
Verifications.io (first leak)	2019	09,000,000	online marketing	poor security	[621]
Collection No. 1	2019	73,000,000	various	compilation of multiple data breaches	[258]
Ticketmaster	2024	60,000,000	ticket distribution	hacked third party service	[581][582]
Facebook	2019	40,000,000	social network	poor security	[335][336]
Marriott International	2018	00,000,000	hotel/casino	hacked	[446]
Yahoo	2014	00,000,000	web	hacked	[644][645][646][647][648]
Friend Finder Network	2016	12,214,295	web	poor security / hacked	[349][350]
Myspace	2016	60,000,000+, ncluding usernames, asswords email ddresses	social network	poor security/account recovery	[469][470][471]
Exactis	2018	40,000,000	data broker	poor security	[322]
Airtel	2019	20,000,000	telecommunications	poor security	[162]
Truecaller	2019	99,055,000	telephone directory	unknown	[595][596]
MongoDB	2019	75,000,000	tech	poor security	[459]
Wattpad	2020	70,000,000	web	hacked	[630]
Facebook	2019	67,000,000	social network	poor security	[338][339]
Microsoft	2019	50,000,000	tech	data exposed by misconfiguration	[454]

## What Is Computer Security?

# Understanding and improving the behavior of computing technologies in the presence of adversaries



Attackers



Target (victim) computing systems



Defenders: designers, developers, engineers, lawyers, etc.





#### Course Personnel

Instructor: Vitaly Shmatikov TAs: Rishi Jha and Collin Zhang • Office hours: TBD Course website: https://cs5435.github.io/ • Reading materials, lecture notes Slack for discussions and Q&A -- see Canvas for the link **Canvas** for assignments

#### Prerequisites

#### Required: working knowledge of C and JavaScript

- Security is a contact sport!
- Homeworks will involve Web security and writing buffer overflow attacks in C

Required: detailed understanding of x86 architecture and memory management (stack layout, calling conventions, etc.)

#### Recommended:

Operating Systems; Compilers; Computer Networks; Cryptography

 Not much overlap with this course, but will help gain deeper understanding of security mechanisms and where they fit in the big picture



## DO NOT TAKE THIS COURSE IF YOU ARE NOT COMFORTABLE PROGRAMMING IN C AND JAVASCRIPT

#### Consider an Alternative!

TECH 5270 studio module in the spring (four 3-hour sessions)

Not very technical!

Just the basics

- Dos and don'ts of computer security and privacy
- Human factors in security
- Basics of user authentication
- Basics of network and mobile security
- Cybercrime and ransomware
- Ethical data collection and data privacy
- Security and privacy by design
- Industry perspectives

## Grading

Four programming projects (15% each) Two take-home exams (15% each) Attendance and participation (10%) Cornell University Code of Academic Integrity will be strictly enforced

#### Homeworks / Projects

Can work with one partner, if you want to

Collaboration policy

• No collaboration with people outside team

- Using the web for general information is encouraged
- Googling for answers to questions is not

Homeworks need to be done in a virtual environment, will help you setup in Homework 1

Cheating such as plagiarizing homework answers or copying code will trigger disciplinary actions

#### Late Submission Policy

Each assignment is due at 11:59p ET on the due date
You have 3 late days to use any way you want
You can submit one assignment 3 days late, 3 assignments 1 day late, etc.
After you use up your days, you get 0 points for each late assignment
Partial days are rounded up to the next full day

#### Course Materials

No textbook

Occasional readings (see course website)

Lectures will cover some material that is <u>not</u> in the notes or readings – and you will be tested on it!

#### Learning Objectives

Understand the system's security goals Learn to spot security vulnerabilities Think through how attacks would play out Understand and deploy countermeasures

#### Security goals

# ConfidentialityData not leakedIntegrityData/service not modifiedAuthenticityData/action comes from who we think it doesAvailabilityService available when needed

#### Threat modeling

Who are the adversaries? What are their goals? What are their capabilities?



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							100	-	-		

Personal	Small Bu	usiness	Comm	nercial
Banking and	Credit Cards	Loans and	Credit	Investing and Retireme

Personal > Privacy, Cookies, Security, and Legal

#### Privacy, Cookies, Security, and Legal



#### U.S. Privacy Policies and Notices

- Wells Fargo U.S. Consumer Privacy Notice
- California Consumer Privacy Act Notice
- Digital Privacy and Cookies Policy
- Wells Fargo Retail Services Privacy Notice (PDF)
- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Dillard's Privacy Notice (PDF)
- Health Information Notice
- Social Security Number Protection Policy

#### Legal Terms

- ESIGN Consent
- General Terms of Use
- Online Access Agreement

#### International Privacy Notice

+ **special sets of notices** for Australia, Canada, EU, New Zealand, South Korea

#### International Non-Employee Privacy Notices + special notices for Canada, EU, South Korea

#### Global Data Access

What Do You Think Should Be Included in "Privacy and Security" for an E-commerce website?

## Desirable Properties

. . .

Authenticity	
Confidentiality	
Integrity	
Availability	
Accountability and non	-repudiation
Access control	
Privacy of collected info	ormation

#### Correctness vs. Security

#### Correctness

System satisfies specification

For reasonable input, get reasonable output

Modular design may increase vulnerability! Abstraction is difficult to achieve in security: what if the adversary operates below your level of abstraction? ... but also increase security (small TCB)

#### Security

System properties preserved in face of attack

For <u>un</u>reasonable input, output not completely disastrous

Main difference: active interference from an adversary

#### A Security Engineer's Mindset



*Credit: Bruce Schneier* 

#### Ken Thompson



ACM Turing Award, 1983

What code can we trust?

Consider "login" or "su" in Unix

- Is Ubuntu binary reliable? RedHat?
- Does it send your password to someone?
- Does it have backdoor for a "special" remote user?

Can't trust the binary, so check source code or write your own, recompile Does this solve problem?



Who wrote the compiler?

Compiler looks for source code that looks the login process, inserts backdoor into it

Ok, inspect the source code of the compiler... Looks good? Recompile the compiler!

Does this solve the problem?



http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95

The compiler is written in C ... compiler(S) {

if (match(S, "login-pattern")) {

compile (login-backdoor)

return }

if (match(S, "compiler-pattern")) {
 compile (compiler-backdoor)

return }

.... /\* compile as usual \*/ }



http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95



"The moral is obvious. You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.)"



http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95

#### Network Stack



Only as secure as the <u>single</u> weakest layer... or interconnection between the layers

#### Network Defenses



#### Bad News

Security often not a primary consideration

• Performance and usability take precedence

Feature-rich systems may be poorly understood

#### Implementations are buggy

- Buffer overflows are the "vulnerability of the decade"
- Cross-site scripting and other Web attacks
- Emerging classes of attacks: SSRF, others

Networks are more open and accessible than ever

• Increased exposure, easier to cover tracks

Many attacks are not even technical in nature

• Phishing, social engineering, etc.

#### Better News

There are a lot of defense mechanisms

#### It's important to understand their limitations

- "If you think cryptography will solve your problem, then you don't understand cryptography... and you don't understand your problem"
- Many security holes are based on a misunderstanding

Security awareness and user "buy-in" help

Other important factors: usability and economics

## Main Themes of the Course

#### Vulnerabilities of modern systems and networks

 Phishing, credential theft, denial of service, attacks on Web applications, attacks on system software, attacks on infrastructure

#### Defensive technologies

- Authentication
- Web and mobile security
- Basic cryptography, application and transport-layer security protocols
- Protection of software: memory integrity, code analysis, intrusion detection

#### Running Example: A Simple Web Service



#### Securing a Web Service

- Authentication, passwords
- Abuse
- Web security
- Network security
- Brief intro to cryptography
- Operating systems security
- Memory corruption vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows)
- Database security, virtualization and cloud security

#### What This Course Is Not About

Not a comprehensive course on computer security Not a course on ethical, legal, or economic issues • No file sharing, DMCA, piracy, free speech issues • Little about surveillance

Only a cursory overview of cryptography

Only some issues in systems security

 Very little about OS access control, secure hardware, security of embedded devices, physical security...

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#### Peek at the Dark Side



The <u>only</u> reason we will be learning about attack techniques is to build better defenses

Do not even think about using this knowledge to attack anyone





## Rules of Thumb

When in doubt ... don't

- Find someone to talk to (instructor or TA)
- You must have explicit written permission from the system owner before performing any penetration testing
  - Homework assignments will generally be in an isolated virtual environment
  - We will give explicit permission to hand us exploits to test

#### Responsible Disclosure

Full disclosure means revealing everything about a vulnerability including an example exploit

**Responsible disclosure** (generally) refers to ensuring potential victims are aware of vulnerabilities before going public

#### Who Are the Adversaries?

- "31337" script kiddies
- Abusers / harassers / cyberstalkers
- "Hacktivists"
- Criminals (often economically motivated)
- Nation-states

## Hacking Commoditized

Metasploit

- All-in-one penetration testing tool
- Easy-to-use exploit libraries

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Open Source Full Text Sea	e Vulnerability I arch	DataBase ID	Bugtra Comm	ıq ID on Vulnerabilities Expo	sures ID	

Public Amazon credentials for AWS, S3 buckets, ...

• Source of many recent breaches

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Wondering what is this website ? Read details here: How to
search for Open Amazon s3 Buckets and their contents

Keywords

keywords

Full Path

Search

https://slate.com/technology/2020/08/uber-joseph-sullivan-charged-data-breach.html

## About S3: The Story of a Hack

Did not protect essential credentials



- 2014: Uber's source code on GitHub accessed using stolen credentials
- In the source code, keys to all Uber's S3 databases
- 2016: Uber's driver database stolen using <u>same</u> credentials



Cloud keys hardcoded in source code



In the document that Uber used to track the progress of its investigation of the 2016 breach, one team member commented on Nov. 14, "access key has not be rotated [sic] since [it was created in 2013]. None of the people are at the company any longer. Task was to rotate keys within S3 to ensure this could not happen in the future but there are thousands of tasks. Joe was just deposed on this specific topic and what the best or minimum practices that any company should follow in this area."



https://slate.com/technology/2020/08/uber-joseph-sullivan-charged-data-breach.html

## How <u>Not</u> to Handle a Data Breach

- 2016: Uber pays hackers \$100,000 via Bitcoin as a "bug bounty", covers up the hack
- 2019: Hackers plead guilty to trying to extort Uber and LinkedIn in exchange for promise to delete data they stole from S3
- 2020: US Dept of Justice charges Joe Sullivan, Uber's former Chief Security Officer
- 2022: Sullivan convicted of obstruction of justice and misprision (failure to report knowledge of a felony)

First federal prosecution of a corporate executive for the handling of a data breach





## Review of the Summer 2023 Microsoft Exchange Online Intrusion

Compromise of the email accounts of senior US government representatives working on national security matters using a compromised Microsoft signing key (enabling creation of forged authentication tokens)

# Top companies ground Microsoft Copilot over data governance concerns

"... bigger companies that have complex permissions around their SharePoint or their Office 365 or things like that, where the Copilots are basically aggressively summarizing information that maybe people technically have access to but shouldn't have access to"

https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/CSRB\_Review\_of\_the\_Summer\_2023\_MEO\_Intrusion\_Final\_508c.pdf https://www.theregister.com/2024/08/21/microsoft\_ai\_copilots/

#### Spy On Your Girlfriend's Cell Phone Without Touching It

#### Cheating Partner? Spy on their phone secretly!

#### Abusers

- ° "Cyberbullying"
- Online stalkers, remote access trojan (RATs)
- Intimate partner violence (IPV)
  - Widespread: 1 out of 4 women, 1 out of 9 men suffer at some point in lives
  - Tech abuse rampant: account compromise, spyware, social media harassment...

#### "Hacktivists"



## Anonymous vs HBGary (2011)



## Anonymous vs HBGary

http://www.hbgaryfederal.com/pages.php?pageNav=2&page=27



usernames, password hashes

SQL injection attack

h = hash(pw)

Given hash h, recover pw by brute force attack if pw is "simple" enough and hash function weak (CMS used MD5, no salts -- exceedingly weak!) hbgaryfederal.com

Used vulnerable CMS, content-management system (like Wordpress, Joomla, Drupal) Ted Vera (COO) and Aaron Barr (CEO) of HBGary had passwords with only 6 digits, lower case letters and numbers

JohntheRipper easily inverts hashes of such passwords http://www.openwall.com/john/



#### Using Ted's Access Credential: SSH Access



login: ted password: tedv12

COO Ted used same password for SSH, gave user level access to Linux system

Exploited privilege escalation vulnerability in the glibc linker on Linux

http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Oct/257

Now have root access on hbgaryfederal.com Delete gigabytes of data, grab emails, take down phone system

hbgaryfederal.com Attack in 2011: System not up-todate on patches

## Using Aaron's Access Credential: Gmail Control



login: aaron password: aaro34



CEO Aaron used same password for gmail account

Aaron was administrator for companies' email on Google apps

Full control over owner Greg's email account

#### Using Gary's Email: Access to rootkit.com

From: Greg To: Jussi Subject: need to ssh into rootkit im in europe and need to ssh into the server. can you drop open up firewall and allow ssh through port 59022 or something vague? and is our root password still 88j4bb3rw0cky88 or did we change to 88Scr3am3r88 ? thanks





#### **Economically Motivated Criminals**

English



#### Ooops, your files have been encrypted!

What Happened to My Computer? Your important files are encrypted. Many of your documents, photos, videos, database accessible because they have been encrypted. May recover your files, but do not waste your time. No our decryption service.

Wana Decrypt0r 2.0

#### **Can I Recover My Files?**

We will I

How D

Payment

Please ch

click <Ho

And send

After you

Payment will be raised on

5/16/2017 00:47:55

Time Left

02:23:57:37

Your files will be lost on

5/20/2017 00:47:55

**Time Left** 

06:23:57:37

About bitcoin

How to buy bitcoins?

Contact Us

Sure. We guarantee that you can recover all your into so enough time. You can decrypt some of your files for free. Try no But if you want to decrypt all your files, you need You only have 3 days to submit the payment. After Also, if you don't pay in 7 days, you won't be able to recover

#### Ransomworms impacted millions of victims

Destructive ransomworms had a global impact and caused massive financial losses in 2017.

Destructive ransomworms took center stage among notable ransomware in 2017

#### **NotPetya**

USD892 million in damages Spread to 65 countries

Bad Rabbit Targeted critical infrastructure

#### WannaCry

Spread to **150 countries** USD8 billion+ in damages

## Colonial Pipeline paid 75 Bitcoin, or roughly \$5 million, to hackers.

## Marketplace for Vulnerabilities

Bug bounty programs • Google, Facebook, Microsoft: up to \$20-100K per bug Vulnerability brokers Gray and black markets • Over \$1,000,000 for iOS and Android zero-days

#### **Payouts Changelog** Changes as of Sep. 13, 2018: Bounties for both Desktops/Servers and Mobile exploits were updated with new entries and increased payouts Modification Details \$100,000 - nginx RCE i.e. remote exploits via HTTP(S) requests or related protocols \$100,000 - Exim RCE i.e. remote exploits via a malicious email or related vectors New Entries \$80,000 - cPanel Webmin Plesk RCF i.e. remote pre-auth exploits for major control panels (Servers/Desktops) \$50,000 - BSD LPE i.e. privilege escalation for NetBSD, OpenBSD, or FreeBSD \$30,000 - WinRAR, 7-Zip, WinZip, tar RCE i.e. code execution via a malicious archive file \$500,000 - Windows RCE (Zero Click) e.g. via SMB or RDP packets (previously: \$300,000) \$250,000 - Aparbe or MS IIS RCF i.e. remote exploits via HTTP(S) requests (previously: \$150,000) \$250,000 - Chrome RCE + SBX (Windows) including a sandbox escape (previously: \$150,000) \$150,000 - Outlook RCE i.e. remote exploits via a malicious email (previously: \$100,000) \$150,000 - PHP or OpenSSL RCE (previously: \$100,000) \$150,000 - MS Exchange Server RCE (previously: \$100,000) \$100,000 - Dovecot, Postfix, Sendmail RCE (previously; \$50,000) Increased Payouts \$100,000 - VMWare ESXI VM Escape i.e. guest-to-host escape (previously: \$80,000) (Servers/Desktops) \$100,000 - Chrome RCE without a sandbox escape (previously: \$50,000) \$100,000 - Egde RCE + SBX including a sandbox escape (previously: \$80,000) \$100,000 - MS Word/Excel RCE i.e. exploit via a malicious Office document (previously: \$50,000) \$100,000 - Thunderbird RCE i.e. remote exploits via a malicious email (previously: \$80,000) \$80,000 - WordPress (Core) RCE i.e. remote pre-auth exploits (previously: \$50,000 \$50,000 - Edge, Safari, Firefox RCE without a sandbox escape (previously: \$30,000) \$50,000 - Windows or Linux LPE (previously: \$30,000) New Entries None (Mohiles) \$200,000 - Chrome RCE + SBX (Android) including a sandbox escape (previously: \$150,000) \$200,000 - Safari + SBX (IOS) including a sandbox escape (previously: \$150,000) Increased Payouts \$200,000 - Baseband RCE + LPE (IOS or Android) including a privilege escalation (previously: \$150,000) (Mobiles) \$100,000 - Chrome RCE (Android) without a sandbox escape (previously: \$50,000) \$100,000 - Safari RCE (IOS) without a sandbox escape (previously: \$50,000) (Desktop) Adobe Flash RCE (previously: \$80,000) **Deleted Entries** (Mobiles) SS7 Protocol Exploits (previously: \$100,000)

*Source: Zerodium* 

#### Marketplace for Stolen Data

Single credit card number: \$4-15

Single card with magnetic track data: \$12-30

"Fullz": **\$25-4**0

 Full name, address, phone, email addresses (with passwords), date of birth, SSN, bank account and routing numbers, online banking credentials, credit cards with magnetic track data and PINs

Online credentials for a bank account with \$70-150K balance: under \$300

Prices dropped in the last 10 years, indicating supply glut

## Marketplace for Victims

Pay-per-install on compromised machines
US: \$40-120 / 1000 downloads, "global mix": \$10-12
Can be used to send spam, stage denial of service attacks, perform click fraud, host scam websites

Botnets for rent

- DDoS: up to \$100/hour
- Spam: from \$1/10,000 emails

Tools and services

 Basic Trojans (\$3-10), Windows rootkits (\$300), email, SMS, botnet setup and support (\$200/month)



#### Ransomware attempts reached an unprecedented level in 2021...

Global ransomware attempts (m)



#### Key enabling technology:



Source: Financial Times

#### Nation-States



Sabotage of Iranian nuclear program

#### China accused of cyberattack on Microsoft Exchange servers

#### 2016 hack of Democratic National Committee



# <section-header><section-header><text><text><image>

North Korean bank heists

#### A Brief History of WannaCry and NotPetya (2017)

**EternalBlue** Windows exploit

• Discovered by NSA, stolen and released by "The Shadow Brokers"

WannaCry cryptoworm/ransomware used exploit to infect over 230,000 machines

- Origin unclear, attributed to North Korea
- Disrupted service at 16 hospitals in the UK, also affected FedEx, Telefonica, Russian Interior Ministry, Honda, ...

NotPetya worm released as part of the Russia-Ukraine conflict

- \$10 billion in damages (e.g., took Maersk a major shipping company offline)
- Cyber insurers refused to cover, claiming it was an act of war

## Pegasus: Commercialization of Intelligence Tools

Pegasus is spyware tool built by NSO, a company based in Israel

Remote compromise of iOS devices

Sold to law enforcement and government intelligence

Tech > Mobile

#### Pegasus Spyware and Citizen Surveillance: Here's What You Should Know

NSO Group's software targeted activists, journalists, politicians and executives. Apple's new Lockdown Mode is designed to thwart it.



9 min read 🔗

## Security Principles

1) Economy of mechanism 2) Fail-safe defaults 3) Complete mediation 4) Open design 5) Separation of privilege 6) Least privilege 7) Least common mechanism 8) Psychological acceptability

Saltzer and Schroeder. The protection of information in computer systems. Proceedings of the IEEE, 1975





See readings on the course website to self-test

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